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This Article analyzes Riley v. California, in which the Supreme Court considered 
whether the police could, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized 
from an arrestee. The Riley Court, in refusing to extend its search incident to arrest exception to 
these searches, ruled that the Fourth Amendment required police obtain a warrant to lawfully 
search cell phones upon arrest. This work examines the implications of Riley’s ruling. This 
Article asserts that, in justifying its mandate that cell phone searches be supported by a warrant, 
Riley created two categories of Fourth Amendment “effects”: “physical objects” and devices 
holding “digital data.” Further, Riley’s characterization of cell phone privacy as equivalent to or 
greater than the privacy of the home dramatically expanded the “core” of Fourth Amendment 
privacy. Finally, Riley’s “cloud computing” analysis turned the Fourth Amendment’s third-party 
doctrine on its head. As discussed in this work, each one of these significant developments could 
create uncertainty for courts and police. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When does a difference in degree become a difference in kind? What amount of 
information must an object contain to cross the Fourth Amendment’s threshold of privacy, 
requiring it to be protected by a warrant?
1
 If an object contains thousands of words and dozens of 
pictures, is it a constitutional cipher compared to an item that can hold millions of words and 
thousands of images? Suppose an officer arrests an individual and finds two items on the 
arrestee’s person. One is a brand new iPod or iPhone, containing nothing but a digitized version 
of a single novella, John Steinbeck’s The Pearl. The other object is a paperback book of Leo 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace, the pages of which have been lovingly annotated by the personal notes 
of its reader. Is one book more deserving of privacy than the other? The Supreme Court thinks so, 
and its answer focuses on the media that present the information. In the recent case of Riley v. 
California, the Court found itself drawing a Fourth Amendment line between what it called 
“physical objects,”
2
 such as the paperback, and “digital data,”
3
 such as the iPhone. 
The Court, noting that cell phones have become a pervasive part of so many aspects of 
our lives,
4
 determined that these digital items can no longer be equated with traditional Fourth 
Amendment effects—“a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.”
5
 Instead of being merely “physical 
objects,” cell phones are a different class of effect—vessels of “digital data” needing their own 
Fourth Amendment protection.
6
 These digital devices are so distinct that they possess privacy 
interests equivalent to, or even exceeding, the home,
7
 which itself was once viewed as the Fourth 
Amendment’s “core.”
8
 Cell phones offer such a difference from traditional physical objects that 
they “strain” the Court’s Fourth Amendment definition of a “container.”
9
 Since cell phones take 
“advantage of ‘cloud computing,’” where information is stored on “remote servers,” privacy 
issues become all the more complex.
10
 Phone users themselves might not know precisely where 
their intimate information is stored.
11
 The enormous differences in cell phones—the vast personal 
                                                                
1  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
Id. 
2  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
3  Id. at 2485. 
4  Id. at 2489. 
5  Id. at 2489-90. 
6  Id. at 2489.  
7  Id. at 2491. 
8  Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
9  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
10  Id.  
11  Id.  
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data they store, their equivalence to a private residence which one can carry in a pocket, the 
confusion about where their private information actually resides—persuaded the Court in Riley to 
treat these digital devices differently from the usual items found upon an arrestee.
12
 Digital data is 




Each contention Riley offered in support of cell phone privacy could have significant 
implications for Fourth Amendment doctrine. Part I of this Article reviews the Court’s warrant 
mandate and the “search incident to arrest” exception to this requirement. Part II considers the 
facts and ruling of Riley. Part III critically examines the potential impact of the rationales the 
Court offered to support Fourth Amendment privacy of cell phones. By distinguishing “digital 
data” from mere “physical items,”
14
 Riley effectively created two classes of effects: the first 
kind—the traditional object—being vulnerable to search incident to arrest without a warrant, and 
the second kind—the digital device—requiring a warrant before any such search. This division of 
effects into two constitutional categories could have unforeseen consequences. Furthermore, 
equating cell phone privacy with the intimacies of the home could cause unintended results. The 
expansion of privacy rights for data devices used everywhere could later result in pressure on the 
Court to limit Fourth Amendment protection over cell phones, which could then result in eroding 
the privacy of homes, which Riley equates with phones. Finally, Riley’s acceptance of privacy 
interests even when information is shared in cloud computing could cause the third-party doctrine 
to be turned on its head, causing an extension, rather than a restriction of Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Warrant Mandate 
Although it flatly commanded police to “get a warrant,” the Riley Court evinced 
ambivalence about the warrant requirement.
15
 On one hand, Riley knew that the need for proper 
warrants was a source of our Founders’ outrage in the American Revolution, noting that 
opposition to general searches gave birth to “the child Independence.”
16
 The Court also noted the 
importance of having “a neutral and detached magistrate” review a warrant application, for such 
an official operated as a buffer between the zealous officer and the citizen.
17
 Riley, therefore, only 
tolerated a warrantless search if it fell within “a specific exception to the warrant requirement.”
18
 
On the other hand, the Court tempered these assertions by voicing doubts about the centrality of 
warrants in Fourth Amendment analysis. Rather than deeming the warrant requirement a general 
                                                                
12  Id. at 2494-95. 
13  Id. at 2495. 
14  Id. at 2489. 
15  Id. at 2495.  
16  Id. at 2494 (quoting 10 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 248 (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. 1856)).  
17  Id. at 2482 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
18  Id. (citing Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011)). 
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rule for all searches, Riley saw it as only a mandate for a particular class of searches involving law 
enforcement pursuit of “evidence of criminal wrongdoing.”
19
 Further, even though it noted that 
search incident to arrest was long seen as “an exception to the warrant requirement,”
20
 the Court 
characterized such a label as a “misnomer” because “warrantless searches incident to arrest occur 
with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”
21
 Finally, it determined 




Riley’s equivocation about warrants was a microcosm of the Court’s internal and 
ongoing tug of war in interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s two clauses: the reasonableness 
clause, which declares “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” and the warrant clause, 
which provides, “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”
23
 The Fourth Amendment itself offers little guidance about the relationship between the 
reasonableness command and the recipe for a warrant, for it connects the two clauses with the 
ambiguous conjunction “and.”
24
 The Court itself has recognized this uncertainty, acknowledging 




The Court identified warrants as a bulwark against arbitrary power only a few decades 
after the Civil War in Boyd v. United States.
26
 In Boyd, the Court warned against leaving “the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”
27
 Later, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the Court, in Weeks v. United States, decried a warrantless search, warning: 
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the [Fourth] 
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, 
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution.
28
 
By 1925, the Court, in Agnello v. United States, declared a warrantless search to be “in 
                                                                
19  Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 
20  Id.  
21  Id. (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(b), at 132 & n.15 (5th ed. 2012)). 
22  Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
23  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
24  Id. For an informative discussion of the Court’s interpretation of these two clauses, see Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985). 
25  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
26  Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). Riley itself relied on Boyd when it mentioned James 
Otis’s and John Adams’s resistance to writs of assistance. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
27  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625. 
28  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws.”
29
 The Court required judicial approval through the 
warrant process because it distrusted officers who were subject, in the daily exercise of their 
duties, to the emotional pressures and distorting incentives of pursuing criminals.
30
 The Court, in 
United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, traced the doubts about 
the objectivity of those fighting crime on the front lines to Lord Mansfield in England of 1765.
31
 
The Court noted: 
Over two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield held that common-law principles 
prohibited warrants that ordered the arrest of unnamed individuals who the 
officer might conclude were guilty of seditious libel. “It is not fit,” said 
Mansfield, “that the receiving or judging of the information should be left to the 
discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain 
directions to the officer.”
32
 
The law limited the power of officers because “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates.”
33
 This 
distrust had nothing to do with the individual character of the official in the field. Instead, the 
concern was based on the role every officer undertook. Further, the Court noted: 
[An officer’s] duty and responsibility [was] to enforce the laws, to investigate, 
and to prosecute. But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial 
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive 
means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, which the Fourth 
Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too 
readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential 
invasions of privacy and protected speech.
34
 
Thus, at “the very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive” was a process where an 
officer and magistrate could work together to decide when a search or seizure was reasonable.
35
 
The warrant requirement was not meant as some punitive “inconvenience,” but “an important 
working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-
intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ who are a part of any system of law 
enforcement.”
36
 Any officer acting on his or her own was condemned as bypassing “the 
                                                                
29  Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). 
30  See id.  
31  United States v. United States District Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). 
32  Id. (quoting Leach v. Three of the King’s Messengers, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1001, 1027 (1765)).  
33  Id. at 317. 
34  Id. (citation omitted). 
35  Id. at 316 (stating that “a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the 
officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to 
justify invasion of a citizen’s private premises or conversation”). 
36  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).  
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safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause.”
37
 
It therefore became a cardinal principle that “searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
38
 
The warrant requirement thus became a “valued part of our constitutional law for decades”
39
 and a 
“basic principle of Fourth Amendment law”
40
 that the Court reaffirmed “[t]ime and again.”
41
 The 
warrant mandate amounted to the “Court’s longstanding understanding of the relationship 
between the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment.”
42
 
The warrant requirement, despite its long tenure, did not go unchallenged. A competing 
approach, which employed the reasonableness clause without reference to the warrant clause, 
received sporadic but increasingly frequent mention over the years. The Second Circuit in United 
States v. Rabinowitz questioned the warrant mandate as early as 1949.
43
 On appeal, the Supreme 
Court declared: 
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a search 
warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The mandate of the 
Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against unreasonable 
searches. . . . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search 
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.
44
 
Justice Scalia harkened back to this theme in his concurring opinion in California v. 
Acevedo, a case interpreting the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
45
 Justice Scalia 
reiterated that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches 
and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”
46
 He noted that 
the language of the Fourth Amendment explicitly limited the use of warrants (allowing only those 
warrants possessing the ingredients of probable cause, oath or affirmation, and particular 
description), but did not compel their use.
47
 Justice Scalia explained that warrants, instead of 
being perceived as a protection for the citizen, provided officials who bothered to obtain them 
                                                                
37  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
38  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted).   
39  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481. 
40  Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
41  Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993). Rather than a mere formality, the warrant served 
“a high function.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
455) (1948)). Chimel was eventually recognized as abrogated in Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
42  Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 nn.18-19).  
43  United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
44  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. 
45  California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
46  Id. at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
47  See id. 
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absolute immunity from personal liability in any later lawsuit over the search.
48
 He saw the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment case law as “lurch[ing] back and forth between imposing a 
categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”
49
 While Justice Scalia 
acknowledged that, “[b]y the late 1960s, the preference for a warrant had won out,” he saw this 
victory as “illusory” because the requirement was riddled with almost twenty exceptions.
50
 He 
urged remedying the problem by a return to the “first principle” of “reasonableness.”
51
 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness as a standard in its own right percolated into the 
Court’s consciousness. By 2006, the Court, in Brigham City v. Stuart, declared “the ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”
52
 Stuart, in which police entered a 
home after observing a fist fight draw blood, involved the “exigent circumstances” exception to 
the warrant requirement.
53
 The Court reiterated its reasonableness-as-touchstone statement in two 
more exigent circumstance cases. The first case was Michigan v. Fisher, in which police entered a 
house after coming upon a “smashed” truck in the driveway and a screaming man in the home.
54
 
The next case, Kentucky v. King, involved a warrantless entry by police to prevent the destruction 
of evidence.
55
 The first mention of reasonableness-as-touchstone outside of exigent circumstances 
occurred in Fernandez v. California.
56
 Fernandez considered whether police could enter a home 
with the consent of one occupant when another, objecting occupant was absent from the 
premises.
57
 Fernandez somewhat marginalized the warrant requirement by noting that “‘the text 
of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained.’”
58
 Thus, 
when Riley itself noted that reasonableness was the Fourth Amendment’s “ultimate touchstone,”
59
 
it was referencing an explicit shift away from the warrant mandate begun eight years earlier.
60
 
                                                                
48  See id. (citing Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814)). Justice Scalia explained: 
[T]he warrant was a means of insulating officials from personal liability assessed by colonial juries. 
An officer who searched or seized without a warrant did so at his own risk; he would be liable for 
trespass, including exemplary damages, unless the jury found that his action was “reasonable.” . . . 
If, however, the officer acted pursuant to a proper warrant, he would be absolutely immune. . . . By 
restricting the issuance of warrants, the Framers endeavored to preserve the jury’s role in regulating 
searches and seizures.  
Id. at 581-82 (citations omitted). 
49  Id. at 582. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 583. 
52  Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. 
53  Id. at 400-02. 
54  Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 45-46 (2009). 
55  Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1853-54. 
56  Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014). 
57  Id. at 1129-30. 
58  Id. at 1132 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856). 
59  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
60  Having the Fourth Amendment’s “touchstone” simply be “reasonableness” raised its own concerns. 
What was “reasonable” might be founded “on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts 
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B. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
The exception proposed to justify the warrantless search in Riley was a search incident to 
arrest.
61
 Riley noted that the Court first mentioned “search incident to arrest” in dictum in Weeks 
v. United States.
62
 Previously, the Court spoke even more plainly, declaring that “[v]irtually all of 
the statements of this Court affirming the existence of an unqualified authority to search incident 
to a lawful arrest are dicta.”
63
 Despite its “sketchy” origins,
64
 search incident to arrest has become 




Despite much effort expended by the Court to clarify the origins and scope of search 
incident to arrest, questions remain.
66
 Riley itself demonstrated this; one of the reasons Justice 
Alito wrote a separate opinion was to express his own views regarding the basis of search incident 
to arrest.
67
 The Court has lamented that a historical review of search incident to arrest has been 
frustratingly fruitless; “such authorities as exist are sparse” because the early law of arrest was 
“rough and rude.”
68
 The Court, in United States v. Robinson, interpreted the very lack of authority 
as evidence of search incident to arrest’s validity, for the scarcity of early case law could be “due 
in part to the fact that the issue was regarded as well settled.”
69
 
The Court, in Chimel v. California, sought to provide a clear and pragmatic rule 
regarding the scope of search incident to arrest.
70
 The Chimel Court ruled that “[w]hen an arrest is 
made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any 
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”
71
 Such a 
search was justified for purposes of officer safety.
72
 Chimel also thought it was “entirely 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in 
                                                                
of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-65. The 
conclusion that a search was “reasonable” needed “some criterion of reason.” Id. at 765. Otherwise, the Court recognized, 
Fourth Amendment protections “would approach the evaporation point.” Id. 
61  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
62  See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
63  United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973). 
64  Id. at 232. 
65  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(b), at 132 & n.15 
(5th ed. 2012)). 
66  The Court considered the origins of search incident to arrest in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 
230. The Court provided a thorough analysis of the scope of search incident to arrest in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752. 
67  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (Alito, J., concurring). 
68  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 230. 
69  Id. at 233. 
70  See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63. 
71  Id. at 763. 
72  See id.  
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order to prevent its concealment or destruction.”
73
 Thus, the Court provided a search right for 
weapons and for evidence of the crime. Chimel then allowed officers to search beyond the 
arrestee’s person to “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary items.”
74
 Chimel’s designation of boundary “area ‘within [the arrestee’s] immediate 
control’” boundary was meant to provide adequate protection and guidance for police.
75
 
After Chimel, a question persisted about whether the Court’s rationales for search 
incident to arrest—officer safety and preservation of evidence—operated as limits on this warrant 
exception. While confronting this issue, Robinson broke down search incident to arrest down into 
“two distinct propositions.”
76
 First, “a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue 
of the lawful arrest.”
77
 Second, “a search may be made of the area within the control of the 
arrestee.”
78
 Robinson explained that the search of the “person” and the “area” around the person 
were to be “treated quite differently.”
79
 While the second proposition of searching the surrounding 
area suffered from “differing interpretations,” the “unqualified authority”
80
 of the first proposition 
to search the person “has been regarded as settled from its first enunciation.”
81
 
Robinson next placed search incident to arrest on a foundation independent of the 
warrant requirement. Rather than being merely an exception to the warrant requirement, search 
incident to arrest provided officers with “an affirmative authority to search” based on the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness requirement.
82
 Because the very fact of the lawful arrest established 
the authority to search, Robinson held that “in the case of a lawful custodial arrest[,] a full search 
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement” but is also a “reasonable” 
search under the Fourth Amendment.
83
 Robinson therefore refused to force the government to 
litigate in either case whether one of Chimel’s reasons—officer safety or preservation of 
evidence—existed for searching a person incident to arrest.
84
 Instead, a lawful arrest based on 
                                                                
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. Chimel cautioned, “[t]here is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any 
room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through all the desk drawers or other 
closed or concealed areas in that room itself.” Id.  
76  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. 
77  Id.  
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 224-25. 
81  Id. at 224. 
82  Id. at 226. 
83  Id. at 235. 
84  See id. The Robinson Court declared:  
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the 
person of the suspect.  
Id. 
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probable cause was reasonable, and “that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest 
requires no additional justification.”
85
 Thus, while the Court recognized its own warrant 
requirement, this Fourth Amendment protection seemingly had tenuous control over search 
incident to arrest after Robinson. 
II.  RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
A.  The Facts of Riley v. California 
On August 22, 2009, San Diego Police Officer Charles Dunnigan pulled over David 
Riley in his Lexus for driving with expired registration tags.
86
 When Dunnigan checked Riley’s 
license, he found it was suspended.
87
 Deciding to impound Riley’s car, Dunnigan, with the help of 
a fellow officer, performed an inventory search of the vehicle pursuant to department policy.
88
 
During this search, the officers found two firearms under the car’s hood and arrested Riley for 
possession of concealed and loaded firearms.
89
 Dunnigan searched Riley incident to this arrest 
and recovered the following items indicating membership in the “Bloods” street gang: a green 
bandana and a keychain with a “miniature pair of red-and-green Converse shoes.”
90
 Dunnigan 
also found a smart phone in Riley’s pants pocket and scrolled through its text messages.
91
 The 
officer noticed that some words in text messages and the phone’s contact list “normally beginning 
with the letter ‘K’ were preceded by the letter ‘C.’”
92
 Dunnigan believed that this “CK” prefix 
stood for “‘Crip Killers,’ a slang term for members of the Bloods gang.”
93
 
Dunnigan called in Duane Malinowski, a detective in the department’s gang suppression 
team, who arrived at the station about two hours after Riley’s arrest.
94
 Malinowski reviewed and 
downloaded content on the phone, including photographs, videos, and phone numbers.
95
 In 
particular, Malinowski noticed videos of street boxing, or sparring,
96
 during which someone 
                                                                
85  Id. 
86  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480; Brief for Petitioner at 4, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 
13-132) [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].  
87  Brief for Respondent at 1, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (No. 13-132) [hereinafter Brief 
for the Respondent]. 
88  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 4. 
89  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 87, at 1.   
90  Id. at 2; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 5 (noting the recovery of the keychain). 
91  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 87, at 4-5; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 87, at 2. The 
Court noted that a smart phone is “a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing 
capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. The phone was a Samsung SPH-
M800 Instinct. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 4-5. 
92  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 5. 
93  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 5. 
94  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 5; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 87, at 2. 
95  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 5-6 (citation omitted).  
96  Id. at 6. 
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yelled encouragement “using the moniker ‘Blood.’”
97
 Malinowski also noticed photos of Riley 
making gang gestures in front of a red Oldsmobile police suspected had been involved in a recent 
shooting.
98
 Authorities ultimately charged Riley “in connection with that earlier shooting, with 
firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.”
99
 The 
government also added gang allegations that could enhance Riley’s sentence.
100
 When Riley 
urged that the searches of his phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the trial court rejected 
his contentions, allowing police to testify about the photographs and videos they had found.
101
 
Upon conviction, Riley was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
102
 
B.  The Facts of United States v. Wurie 
United States v. Wurie was the companion case that the Court decided with Riley.
103
 In 
Wurie, on September 5, 2007, Sergeant Detective Paul Murphy, a supervisor of a drug control 
unit in South Boston, was patrolling in an unmarked vehicle.
104
 Around 6:45 p.m., Murphy 
observed Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale while driving his buyer in a Nissan Altima 
sedan.
105
 After the buyer, Fred Wade, left Wurie’s vehicle, Murphy and another officer 
approached Wade, recovered from him two “8-balls” of crack cocaine, and learned from him that 
the seller lived in South Boston and generally sold crack cocaine in “quantities no smaller than an 
8-ball.”
106




At the station, police seized from Wurie “two cell phones, a key ring with keys, and 
$1,275 in cash.”
108
 Shortly after Wurie arrived at the station, officers noticed that one of Wurie’s 
phones
109
 was repeatedly receiving calls from “a source identified as ‘my house’ on the phone’s 
external screen.”
110
 The officers opened the phone, seeing “a photograph of a woman and a baby 
                                                                
97  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
98  Police believed the car had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier. Id. (citation omitted); 
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 86, at 6. 
99  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.  
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Wurie originated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See United States v. 
Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. 104 (D. Mass. 2009). After the case was reversed and remanded by the First Circuit, 728 F.3d 1 
(1st Cir. 2013), the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2014. See 134 S. Ct. 999 (2014). The case was decided 
simultaneously with Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
104  Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 106. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. An “8-ball” is 3.5 grams of rock cocaine. Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  The Court of Appeals identified the phone as a gray Verizon LG phone. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 2. 
110  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
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set as the phone’s wallpaper.”
111
 Officers then accessed the phone log and learned the phone 
number attached to the “my house” label.”
112
 Police then used an online phone directory, “Any 
Who,” to trace the number to an apartment in South Boston.
113
 
Police went to the address linked to the phone number, finding the name “Wurie” on one 
of the apartment mailboxes.
114
 Seeing a woman resembling the photograph on Wurie’s phone 
through the window, officers “entered the apartment to ‘freeze’ it” while they sought a search 
warrant.
115
 A later execution of the warrant recovered “215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, 
drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash.”
116
 A grand jury indicted Wurie for 
felony possession of a firearm and ammunition, distribution of cocaine base within one thousand 
feet of a school, and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.
117
 The district court 
denied Wurie’s motion to suppress evidence based on an unconstitutional search of his cell 
phone.
118
 Wurie was convicted and sentenced to 262 months in prison.
119
 
C.  The Court’s Opinion 
The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, framed the issue in Riley as 
“whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized 
from an individual who has been arrested.”
120
 Although Riley analyzed search incident to arrest by 
reviewing what it called the “search incident to arrest trilogy”
121
 of Chimel, Robinson, and 
Arizona v. Gant,
122
 its primary focus was on the implications of smart phone technology.
123
 The 
Court saw “modern cell phones” as “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that a visitor 
from Mars would mistakenly believe them “an important feature of human anatomy.”
124
 Smart 
phones had outstripped Court precedent, for even the relatively recent technology at issue in 
Chimel and Robinson had become obsolete.
125
 
                                                                
111  Id.; Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 106. 
112  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
113  Id.; Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 106-07. 
114  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481; Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 107. 
115  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481; Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 107. 
116  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. 
117  Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d. at 105. 
118  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 2480. 
121  Id. at 2484. 
122  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (focusing on the scope of search incident to arrest in the 
context of vehicle searches).  
123  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. 
124  Id. 
125  The Court declared, “[b]oth [Riley’s and Wurie’s] phones are based on technology nearly 
inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and Robinson were decided.” Id.  
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Riley thus determined that search incident to arrest had to be reassessed with reference to 
smart phone technology. While Robinson’s categorical rule allowing searches upon every lawful 
custodial arrest struck the “appropriate balance in the context of physical objects,” its rationales 
lost logical force with respect to the “digital content on cell phones.”
126
 The government’s 
interests that Robinson had deemed “present in all custodial arrests”—the risks of harm to officers 
and of destruction of evidence—simply did not exist with “digital data.”
127
 Riley also 
reconsidered Robinson’s rule from the other side of the balance: the arrestee’s privacy interests. 
Robinson had regarded an arrestee’s privacy as “significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest 
itself”
128
 because “an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no significant 
Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person.”
129
 However, the Court in Riley 
determined that a cell phone search placing “vast quantities of personal information literally in the 




Riley saw the advent of cell phone technology as necessitating limits on Robinson’s 
search incident to arrest rationale.
131
 The Court, therefore, held that officers must generally secure 
a warrant before conducting a search of cell phones.
132
 With all that cell phones “contain” and all 
they “reveal,” they hold for many Americans, the very “‘privacies of life.’”
133
 Invoking the 
privacy protection for which the Founders fought, Riley ruled that police seeking to search digital 
cell phone data had no choice but to “get a warrant.”
134
 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF RILEY’S REASONING 
A.  In Justifying the Warrant Requirement for Cell Phone Searches, the Court Created a 
Constitutional Distinction Between Two Kinds of Effects: “Physical Objects” and “Digital” Data 
Riley viewed the collection, storage, and use of digital data on cell phones as a 
constitutional game-changer. When the United States attempted to equate searches of “physical 
items” and searches of cell phone data, the Court scoffed that the government was essentially 
likening the Pony Express to the Apollo Space Program,
135
 because cell phones implicated 
“privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a 
purse.”
136
 Riley therefore explicitly ruled out any analogies to the cell phone’s “pre-digital 
                                                                
126  Id. 
127  Id. at 2484-85. 
128  Id. at 2485. 
129  Id. at 2488. 
130  Id. at 2485. 
131  Id.  
132  Id. (citation omitted).  
133  Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625). 
134  Id. at 2495. 
135  Id. at 2488 (declaring that the government’s position was “like saying a ride on horseback is 
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”). 
136  Id. at 2488-89. 
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counterpart”
137




This digital divide made the once-venerated precedent cases, Chimel and Robinson, 
effectively obsolete for an entire class of Fourth Amendment effects. Riley’s smart phone “was 
unheard of ten years ago” and even Wurie’s “less sophisticated” flip phone was only a fifteen-
year-old technology at the time.
139
 Wurie’s phone, so outdated that it had “faded in popularity,” 
still involved technology “nearly inconceivable” to the Court that decided Chimel and 
Robinson.
140
 Robinson had confidently deemed that every arrest posed risks to officer safety and 
preservation of evidence,
141
 while the arrest itself “significantly diminished” any arrestee’s 
privacy interests.
142
 Neither of Robinson’s suppositions survived the invention of the cell phone. It 
was impossible to use a phone’s digital data as a weapon against an officer.
143
 A cell phone itself 
could only be dangerous if it were fashioned into something lethal by, for example, a “razor blade 
hidden between the phone and its case.”
144
 In contrast, any “unknown physical object,”
145
 even a 
crumpled cigarette pack,
146
 could “always pose risks, no matter how slight.”
147
 Riley here used 
absolutes: a physical object “always” posed risks while “[n]o such unknowns exist[ed] with 
respect to digital data.”
148
 
As for preventing the destruction of evidence, both Riley and Wurie conceded that 
officers could have “seized and secured their cell phones” without a warrant to preserve 
evidence.
149
 The Court therefore noted that once officers had the phone, there was “no longer any 
risk that the arrestee himself would be able to delete incriminating data from the phone.”
150
 
Should officers have “specific concerns about the potential loss of evidence in a particular case,” 
such as an attempt to remotely wipe the device, they could justify their warrantless search on the 
independent basis of exigent circumstances.
151
 For government interests in search incident to 
arrest, Riley thus drew a bright and categorical line between the physical and digital worlds. 
                                                                
137  Id. at 2493. 
138  Id. at 2489. 
139  Id. at 2484. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 2484-85. 
142  Id. at 2485. 
143  Riley flatly declared, “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm 
an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.” Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. 
147  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 2486. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 2487. The Court found the exigent circumstances warrant exception to be a “more targeted 
way[]” to address the concern of evidence destruction. Id. at 2487. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss4/2
A NEW DIGITAL DIVIDE - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/24/2015  12:10 PM 
2015] A NEW DIGITAL DIVIDE? 325 
Here, Riley was aware of its departure from Robinson. The Court noted that Robinson 
had admonished “that searches of a person incident to arrest, ‘while based upon the need to 
disarm and to discover evidence,’ are reasonable regardless of ‘the probability in a particular 
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found.’”
152
 Riley, however, insisted on 
considering the risks to officers and evidence with this particular category of effects—cell 
phones—because a “mechanical application of Robinson” could “untether” search incident to 
arrest from its underlying justifications.
153
 Riley’s break with Robinson, however, might have 
been deeper than the Court realized. Robinson had elevated search incident to arrest to something 
more than a mere exception to the warrant requirement by independently basing an “authority to 
search” an arrestee’s person upon the “fact of” a lawful arrest.
154
 By mandating a warrant for the 
search of a cell phone found on an arrestee’s person, Riley brought a category of objects—digital 
devices—under the warrant requirement’s wing. Thus, Robinson’s assertion that search incident 
to arrest of an arrestee’s person is a reasonable search regardless of the Warrant Clause is simply 
no longer good law for cell phones.
155
 
Riley continued to scrutinize the facts of the particular case when assessing the interests 
of the individual implicated by a cell phone search incident to arrest. While Robinson established 
that arrestees have a diminished privacy expectation in physical objects,
156
 Riley determined that 
privacy expectations in digital data added up to “gigabytes,” which translated into “millions of 
pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos”
157
 which go “far beyond” any privacy 
arrestees have in their pockets.
158
 Cell phones are fundamentally different, “in both a quantitative 
and qualitative sense,” from other objects officers might find on an arrestee’s person during a 
search incident to arrest.
159
 Quantitatively speaking, cell phones possess an “immense storage 
capacity” which enables a searcher to reconstruct the “sum of an individual’s private life.”
160
 
Qualitatively speaking, a phone gathers together in one device “many distinct types of 
information.”
161
 The Court reasoned that the “term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading” because these 
devices actually are more akin to “minicomputers” that “could just as easily be called cameras, 
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or 
newspapers.”
162
 Even the cheapest twenty dollar cell phone, the Court cautioned, “might hold 
photographs, pictures, messages, test messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-
                                                                
152  Id. at 2485 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).  
153  Id. at 2484-2485 (citing Gant, 556 U.S. 343).  
154  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. In Riley, the search of the phone was a continuation of a search of the 
arrestee’s person because Officer Dunnigan had recovered the smart phone from Riley’s pocket. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. 
Similarly, the cigarette packet recovered by the officer in Robinson was located in the left breast pocket of the arrestee’s 
coat during a search of the person. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 223. 
155  See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
156  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. 
157  Id. at 2489. 
158  Id. at 2488-89. 
159  Id. at 2489. 
160  Id.  
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
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entry phone book, and so on.”
163
 
Further, the “pervasiveness” of cell phones distinguishes them from traditional physical 
records, for they have become a constant part of people’s lives.
164
 The Court reported that “nearly 
three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time,” 
while twelve percent admitted to using their phones in the shower.
165
 Before the “digital age, 
people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went 
about their day,” and as a result, police searches of personal items on an arrestee amounted to a 
limited investigation.
166
 Now, with most cell phone owners keeping a digital record of “nearly 
every aspect of their lives,” government intrusion into this digital realm constitutes an entirely 
different level of invasion.
167
 Concerning privacy, Riley not only draws a broad boundary between 
physical items and digital data, but also warns that the boundary could become even wider 
because the Court has indicated that it “expect[s] that the gulf between physical practicability and 
digital capacity will only continue to widen in the future.”
168
 
Riley’s concern for individual interests is genuinely significant, for it contrasts sharply 
with the Court’s prior pronouncements on personal privacy. In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, the Court considered the privacy implications involved in the biological testing 
(such as urinalysis) of railroad employees.
169
 Even though it acknowledged that urine tests 
required “employees to perform an excretory function traditionally shielded by great privacy,”
170
 
the Skinner Court concluded that the biological sampling posed “only limited threats to the 
justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees.”
171
 In Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders, the Court considered the constitutionality of a government order that each jail 
detainee submit to a “close visual inspection”
172
 where an individual would strip off his clothing 
and “open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals” while 
deputies looked “for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband.”
173
 After focusing almost solely 
on the government’s interests rather than those of the individual, the Florence Court determined 
that the strip searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment privacy of the detainees.
174
 In 
Maryland v. King, the Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment “prohibits the collection 
and analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted, on felony charges.”
175
 
                                                                
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 2490. 
165  Id.  
166  Id. 
167  Id.  
168  Id. at 2489. 
169  Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1988). 
170  Id. 
171  Id. at 628. 
172  Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (2012). 
173  Id. at 1514. 
174  Id. at 1523. 
175  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
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The King Court deemed the DNA sampling to be only a “minimal”
176
 and “minor” intrusion,
177
 
despite Justice Scalia’s doubt “that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would 
have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”
178
 Curiously, Riley required a 
warrant for an official to scroll through a cell phone while these earlier cases required no warrants 
for mandatory urinalysis, strip searches, or collection of DNA from a body orifice. While the 
Court will protect your cell phone’s wallpaper, it will not step in to prevent an individual from 
being forced to perform an excretory function
179
 or from being “required to lift his genitals, turn 
around, and cough in a squatting position.”
180
 
It must be noted that Skinner, Florence, and King all involved situations where 
government interests were heightened. Skinner involved “special needs beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement” because the biological tests were administered in an effort to promote 
railway safety.
181
 The Florence Court understood the great responsibility corrections officials 
have in ensuring “that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in 
on their bodies.”
182
 King noted that the government had to know “who has been arrested and who 
is being tried.”
183
 Yet Riley was able to value individual privacy even in the context of increased 
danger to police during arrest. Robinson had declared: 
It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case 
of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and 
transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting 
contact resulting from a typical Terry-type stop.
184
 
Arrests must therefore be particularly hazardous, considering that in the less dangerous 
Terry stop, “the answer to the police officer may be a bullet.”
185
 Further, “American criminals 
have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement 
officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.”
186
 Still, even with the 
dangers inherent in arrests, the Court changed course to protect a new class of item—the cell 
phone containing digital data. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
                                                                
176  Id. at 1977. 
177  Id. at 1980. 
178  Id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
179  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. 
180  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514. 
181  Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
182  Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1513. 
183  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1971 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth 
Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
184  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35. 
185  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
186  Id. at 23. 
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violated.”
187
 The Court in Riley has now divided the “effects” category into two classes. One 
group of effects—physical objects—existing since the Founders drafted the Fourth Amendment, 
is subject to the “search incident to arrest” precedent that has been built up over decades. The 
other type of effects—cell phones holding digital information—being newly invented and 
relentlessly evolving, have broken the bounds of Chimel and Robinson. Riley has deemed that 
these new kind of effects, which promise so much for the future, are protected by the warrant, a 
Fourth Amendment bulwark established over two centuries ago. 
B.  The Court’s Characterization of Cell Phone Privacy as Equivalent or Greater than the  
Privacy of the Home Could Have Unintended Consequences 
Riley’s reasoning raises concerns about the enduring centrality of the home in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has previously labeled the home as “the very core” of the 
Fourth Amendment.
188
 From the age of England’s William Pitt
189
 to the twenty-first century,
190
 
the Court has consistently seen the home as a special enclave of privacy—a person’s “castle.”
191
 
The Court in Kyllo v. United States declared that “the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the 
entrance to the house.”
192
 The home was so special that in it, “all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”
193
 In short, when it came to the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court consistently viewed the home as unique—until now. 
Riley expanded the Fourth Amendment’s core from “houses” to “effects”
194
—cell 
phones—by reexamining a truism offered by Judge Learned Hand.
195
 The Court noted, “Learned 
Hand observed . . . that it is ‘a totally different thing to search a man’s pockets and use against 
                                                                
187  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
188  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. The Court declared in Silverman that “[t]he Fourth Amendment, and the 
personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own 
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Id.  
189  See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 n.4 (describing William Pitt’s description of the right to be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion). In an earlier case, Miller v. United States, the Supreme Court quoted William Pitt 
as follows:  
The poorest man in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof 
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm  may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of 
England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!  
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).  
190  The Court, in the 2006 case Georgia v. Randolph, stated that the home “is entitled to special 
protection as the center of the private lives of our people.” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (quoting 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191  Id. 
192  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 
(1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
193  Id. at 37.  
194  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
195  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490-91. (quoting United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 
1926)). 
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him what they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.’”
196
 
Riley responded, “If his pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true.”
197
 
Moreover, the Court found that an intrusion into an effect could be even greater than an invasion 
of a citizen’s own castle, noting: 
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than 
the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital 
form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a 




In 1961, in Silverman v. United States, the Court quoted Judge Jerome Frank as stating: 
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat 
thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him 
without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—
worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must 
provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated 
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s castle.
199
 
After Riley, the Fourth Amendment’s “shelter from public scrutiny”
200
 can now be 
carried around in a person’s own pocket; the constitutional “castle” is a mobile home because it is 
a mobile phone. This “special protection”
201
 has to follow us everywhere because government 
access to the cell phone would otherwise leave us too vulnerable to personal exposure. With its 
gigabytes of data that “can date back to the purchase of the phone,”
202
 the cell phone offers insight 
into our politics, family life, religious beliefs, and even sexual interests.
203
 The “[m]obile 
application software on a cell phone, or ‘apps,’” reveal a “montage of the user’s life.”
204
 Because 
of these cell phone privacy concerns, Riley expanded the “core”
205
 of the Fourth Amendment 
                                                                
196  Id. 
197  Id. at 2491. 
198  Id. (emphasis in original). 
199  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 n.4.  
200  Id. 
201  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). The Court in Randolph declared, “[s]ince we hold to the ‘centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of 
the home,’ ‘it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 
603, 610 (1999); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
202  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
203  Id. at 2490. 
204  Id. The cell phone was “not just another technological convenience,” but a vessel of “‘the privacies 
of life’” for many Americans. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). 
205  Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. 
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exponentially from the “firm line” drawn “at the entrance to the house.”
206
 
Dramatic expansion of constitutional rights, while laudable, can boomerang, as seen with 
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
207
 In the seminal 1968 case, Duncan v. Louisiana, the 
Court held that “the right to jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right and hence 
must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to extend due process of law to all 
persons within their jurisdiction.”
208
 Duncan therefore mandated that “the American States, as in 
the federal system,” had to offer a jury to prevent “miscarriages of justice.”
209
 Later, the Court, in 
Williams v. Florida, interpreted Duncan as equating the state jury trial right with its federal 
counterpart, noting “that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to trial by jury in all 
criminal cases that—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee.”
210
 The equating of the state and federal right meant that any diminution 
of the state right to jury trial would likewise limit the federal right. States, with much heavier 
caseloads, were continually pressured to streamline their criminal procedure rules to cut down on 
case backlogs. Thus, when states aimed to ease the burden on their courts by limiting the content 
of the right to jury trial, these restrictions, if accepted by the Court, would in turn shrink the 
federal right. 
This is precisely what occurred in Williams v. Florida. Over the defendant’s objection, 
Florida tried him before a six-man jury, which Florida law allowed in all but capital cases.
211
 
Despite the fact that “the requirement of twelve” had “become definitely fixed” since the middle 
of the fourteenth century,
212
 the Williams Court dismissed it as an “accidental feature of the 
jury”
213
 and “without significance ‘except to mystics.’”
214
 Since a six-person jury still offered 
“community participation” and “shared responsibility” of a “group of laymen,” the Williams 
Court concluded that “the twelve-man requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable 
component of the Sixth Amendment.”
215
 The Court further eroded the right to jury trial in 
Apodaca v. Oregon, where a jury convicted Robert Apodaca with the less-than-unanimous 
verdict, eleven to one.
216
 Although Apodaca traced “the requirement of unanimity” back to the 
                                                                
206  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
207  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. Id.  
208  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968). 
209  Id. at 157-58. 
210  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (emphasis added). 
211  Id. at 79-80. 
212  Id. at 87 n.19 (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 85 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1898)).  
213  Id. at 90. 
214  Id. at 102 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968)).  
215  Id. at 100. While the number twelve was not “indispensable” to the Court, the number six was. See 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). In Ballew, the Court found that “the purpose and functioning of the jury in a 
criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.” Id.  
216  Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1972). 
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Middle Ages,
217
 it deemed this aspect of jury trials to not be “of constitutional stature.”
218
 In 
finding “no difference between juries required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict 
or acquit by votes of ten to two or eleven to one,”
219
Apodaca found unanimity to no longer be a 
part of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.
220
 
By extending the core of the Fourth Amendment beyond the house to include every cell 
phone carried in public, Riley might have made the privacy of the home vulnerable to unforeseen 
intrusions. In the future, when state governments offer reasons to limit cell phone privacy, such 
arguments could come back to haunt Riley by shrinking the privacy of the home—now equated by 
the Court with digital devices. For instance, perhaps technological advances will allow future 
digital users to effectively seal off their devices from any intruder they have not already cleared 
for sharing. This could happen if technology relying on biometrical markers, such as fingerprints 
or irises, became perfected. If use of such technology became the societal norm, a future court 
could see failure to implement the technology as a passive invitation to intrusion. Such reasoning 
could work its way back to homes—the digital device’s equal—limiting privacy only to those 
homeowners who bothered to use biometric technology to avoid intruders.
221
 
C.  The Court’s “Cloud Computing” Reasoning Turned the Fourth Amendment’s  
Third-Party Doctrine on Its Head 
The Riley Court recognized that cell phone privacy issues were further complicated by 
the fact that certain data might be stored “on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”
222
 
Treating a cell phone as a Fourth Amendment “container”—“‘any object capable of holding 
another object’”—was “a bit strained” even without the complicating factor of cloud 
computing.
223
 The Court found that having a phone act as a “key” giving access (to the cloud) 
rather than as a “house” providing storage (on the device itself) caused “the analogy [to] 
crumble[] entirely.”
224
 The problem was exacerbated by the seamlessness of cloud computing, for 
neither the phone’s owner nor an officer searching it could be certain whether he or she was 
accessing information stored on the phone or in the cloud.
225
 The Court’s candor cast doubt on 
what definition remains for “containers” of digital information. In New York v. Belton, an early 
case involving search of vehicles incident to arrest,
226
 the Court defined containers as follows: 
                                                                
217  Id. at 407. 
218  Id. at 406. 
219  Id. at 411. 
220  Id. at 406. 
221  Katz itself might have left open the door to the erosion of privacy in the home when it noted: “What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  
222  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
223  Id. (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981), abrogated as recognized in Davis v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)).  
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), abrogated, as recognized in Davis v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011)). The Belton Court declared: “[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest 
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“‘[c]ontainer’ here denotes any object capable of holding another object. It thus includes closed or 
open glove compartments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger 
compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.”
227
 Further, in United States 
v. Ross, the Court rejected any “constitutional distinction between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ 
containers,” for “a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag 
or knotted scarf [should be able to] claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official 
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.”
228
 While such refinements 
on defining a container remain valid for physical objects, they now offer little guidance for digital 
devices.
229
 Riley thus created a vacuum in Fourth Amendment container law. In the continually 
growing subject of digital privacy, the Court needs to define digital “houses” or “containers,” or 
offer guidance on the “keys” that open them. 
Furthermore, Riley’s cloud computing confusion could doom the Court’s third-party 
doctrine relating to Fourth Amendment searches.
230
 When Riley recognized that phone users were 
allowing their data to be sent beyond their own personal devices to third-party remote servers, the 
Court did not automatically deem the users’ privacy rights as lost due to this sharing with third 
parties.
231
 In fact, Riley stated that whether the information was in the phone or the cloud made 
“little difference.”
232
 This stance represented a dramatic departure from the third-party doctrine, 
which, over the decades, has significantly limited the definition of a Fourth Amendment search. 
A full appreciation of Riley’s impact on the third-party doctrine requires an 
understanding of the Court’s definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” in Katz v. United 
States.
233
 In Katz, federal agents recorded Katz’s phone conversations involving gambling by 
attaching a device to the outside of a public phone booth he was using to make his calls.
234
 When 
Katz protested that such recording of his private conversations amounted to an unlawful search, 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected his contention because “there was no physical 
entrance into the area” he occupied in the booth.
235
 The Supreme Court in Katz declined the 
physical trespass formulation of the issue,
236
 declaring that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
                                                                
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment 
of that automobile.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
227  Id. at 461 n.4. 
228  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). 
229  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
230  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For an 
illuminating discussion of the Fourth Amendment implications of cloud computing, see David S. Barnhill, Cloud 
Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621 (2010). 
231  Riley, 134 S Ct. at 2491. 
232  Id. 
233  Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361. The third-party doctrine discussed here does not implicate the Court’s 
alternative “property-based” definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” as given in Jones. See 132 S. Ct. at 950.  
234  Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
235  Id. at 349 (quoting Katz v. United States, 369 F. 2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
236  Id. at 350. 
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people, not places.”
237
 Justice Harlan clarified this bold statement by explaining: “My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
238
 The 
resulting “reasonable” or “legitimate expectation of privacy” test provided by Justice Harlan 
became the Court’s definition of a Fourth Amendment “search.”
239
 The reasonableness of privacy 
expectations, however, could be undermined by what “a person knowingly expose[d]” to 
others.
240
 The Court’s later assessment of such exposures would evolve into the third-party 
doctrine. 
The seeds for the third-party doctrine were planted by the Court’s recognition that there 
is no honor among criminals.
241
 In United States v. White, a narcotics dealer made incriminating 
statements to a government informant, unaware that his confidant was broadcasting all that was 
said to agents by radio transmitter.
242
 When White objected that such surveillance violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to privacy, the Court found any reasonable privacy expectation 
undermined by his own choice to speak to the informant.
243
 White intoned: “[T]he law gives no 
protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent . . . .”
244
 
The Court also considered the third-party doctrine in Couch v. United States, a case 
involving an Internal Revenue Service summons for a client’s tax records from an accountant.
245
 
The Couch Court ruled that since the taxpayer here “surrendered possession of the records” to her 
accountant,
246
 she could not reasonably claim a Fourth Amendment “expectation of protected 
privacy.”
247
 Couch knew, when she handed the records to her accountant, that “mandatory 
disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return.”
248
 Couch 




The Court next applied this doctrine to banking in United States v. Miller, in which 
Treasury Department agents subpoenaed the bank records of a whiskey distiller.
250
 When Miller 
complained that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the Court disagreed, noting that 
“[a]ll of the documents obtained” contained “only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks 
                                                                
237  Id. at 351. 
238  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
239  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).  
240  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
241  United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
242  Id. at 746-47. 
243  Id. at 752. 
244  Id. 
245  Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 322 (1973). 
246  Id. at 324. 
247  Id. at 335-36. 
248  Id. at 335. 
249  Id. 
250  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1976). 
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and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”
251
 The Miller Court reasoned 
that the “depositor takes the risk in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.”
252
 It therefore declared: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 




Once a depositor risks sharing information by using the bank, the expectations that his or 
her records will remain private become unreasonable; thus, no warrant is needed because 
obtaining the information is itself not a search.
254
 
The Court next applied the third-party doctrine to telephones, albeit the landline variety, 
in Smith v. Maryland, in which a robber repeatedly called his victim after the robbery to make 
“threatening and obscene phone calls.”
255
 To track down the robber, the government instructed the 
phone company to install a “pen register,” a device that recorded only the numbers dialed from 
the phone in Smith’s home.
256
 When the pen register revealed that, at a particular time, a call was 
placed from Smith’s phone to the victim’s phone, police included this information in a successful 
warrant application of his house.
257
 Smith then contended that the authorities had committed an 
unlawful search by intruding on the “‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers he 
dialed on his phone.”
258
 
The Court disagreed, explaining that every caller realized that “they must ‘convey’ 
phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed.”
259
 Moreover, phone users understood that “the phone 
company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate purposes.”
260
 Therefore, it 
was simply “too much to believe that telephone subscribers . . . harbor[ed] any general 
expectation that the numbers they dial[ed] [would] remain secret.
261
 
The Court, in California v. Greenwood, even applied the third-party doctrine to trash left 
                                                                
251  Id. at 442. 
252  Id. at 443. 
253  Id. 
254  Miller simply dismissed the Fourth Amendment concerns: “Since no Fourth Amendment interests of 
the depositor are implicated here, this case is governed by [another] rule . . . .” Id. at 444. 
255  Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.  
256  Id. Unlike the intrusion in Katz, the pen register in Smith did not collect or record the contents of any 
conversation made on the phone. Id. at 741. 
257  Id. at 737. 
258  Id. at 742. 
259  Id. 
260  Id. at 743. 
261  Id. 
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out on the curb.
262
 In Greenwood, police based a search warrant on evidence they recovered from 
plastic garbage bags that homeowners had left on the curb.
263
 The Court noted that the 
Greenwoods “placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third 
party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted 
others, such as the police, to do so.”
264
 Since the Greenwoods acted with the “express purpose of 
having strangers” take their trash, they “could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
inculpatory items that they discarded.”
265
 
Thus, whether confiding with a fellow criminal, pursuing tax or banking business, 
dialing a phone, or wheeling trash out to the curb, every individual must realize that by sharing 
information, the very act of communication or delivery destroys privacy. There has, however, 
been recent rumbling about the harsh ramifications of the third-party doctrine. Justice Sotomayor, 
in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, suggested that “it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”
266
 She explained that the third-party approach: 
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. 
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular 
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and 
medications they purchase to online retailers. . . . I for one doubt that people 
would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the government of 
a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.
267
 
Justice Sotomayor suggested in concurrence that the Court no longer “treat secrecy as a 
prerequisite for privacy.”
268
 Instead of an all-or-nothing approach to privacy, where sharing 
information with a single party rendered previously secret information open to all, including the 
police, Justice Sotomayor would “not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 




Justice Marshall, who was an early critic of the Court’s third-party doctrine, inspired this 
reasoning.
270
 In Smith, the pen register case, Justice Marshall noted that even if phone users knew 
that they were sharing their phone numbers with the phone company in order to complete their 
calls, this did not mean that customers expected the information about the numbers dialed to be 
                                                                
262  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988). 
263  Id. at 37-38. 
264  Id. at 40. 
265  Id. at 40-41. 
266  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
267  Id. 
268  Id. 
269  Id. 
270  See Smith, 442 U.S. at 748-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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“made available to the public in general or the government in particular.”
271
 Justice Marshall 
recognized that the third-party doctrine was premised on the idea that the individual, in initially 
conveying the information to another party, had made a calculated risk that the information might 
therefore be disclosed to the government.
272
 Such an assumption of risk made practical sense 
when a criminal exercised his discretion to include a confidant in his illegal scheme, as occurred 
in White.
273
 The assumption of risk reasoning fell apart where an individual lacked a choice about 
whether to engage in the information-sharing activity.
274
 Unless a citizen is ready to give up using 
a phone at home—“what for many has become a personal or professional necessity”—he or she 
simply has “no realistic alternative.”
275
 
Justice Marshall’s arguments carry even more force with today’s technology. The third-
party doctrine’s “assumption of risk” analysis would likely ring hollow for most smart phone 
users. Indeed, the twelve percent of smart phone owners who cannot part with their phones even 
during a shower are hardly making rational choices about assumption of risk.
276
 Riley recognized 
that “modern cell phones” are such “a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that Martians 
could confuse them for a part of the human body.
277
 Must an individual today, in order to preserve 
privacy, amputate him or herself from cell phones and the “vast quantities” of information they 
contain?
278
 The Fourth Amendment cannot require that people sacrifice all the services of these 
“minicomputers,” whether such services are with communications, banking, videos, internet 
searches, political affiliations, drug and alcohol recovery, pregnancy, or prayer.
279
 The third-party 
doctrine would force the ninety percent of American adults who use a cell phone to wean 
themselves off from a tool that touches “nearly every aspect of their lives” to preserve what is 
supposed to be a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
280
 
Both Justices Sotomayor and Marshall offered to correct the third-party doctrine by 
implementing a purpose-based approach.
281
 Under such analysis, Justice Marshall explained, 
“[t]hose who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose 
need not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”
282
 
This is because, “[t]he fact that one has disclosed private papers to the bank, for a limited purpose, 
                                                                
271  Id. at 749. 
272  Id. 
273  Id.; White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
274  Smith, 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
275  Id. at 750. 
276  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; see also HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2013 MOBILE CONSUMER HABITS STUDY 
(2013), available at http://pages.jumio.com/rs/jumio/images/Jumio%20-%20Mobile%20Consumer%20Habits%20Study-
2.pdf. 
277  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.  
278  Id. at 2485. 
279  Id. at 2489-90. 
280  Id. at 2490. 
281  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
282  Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (citing Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95-96 (1974)) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
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within the context of a confidential customer-bank relationship, does not mean that one has 
waived all right to the privacy of the papers.”
283
 Justice Marshall likened the bank customer to 
Katz’s caller, “who, having paid the toll, was ‘entitled to assume that the words he utters into the 
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.’”
284
 If Katz could speak into the mouthpiece of the 
telephone in the phone booth secure in the knowledge that sharing the contents of his 
conversation with the listener on the other end of the line did not destroy his Fourth Amendment 
privacy, should not a bank customer, “having written or deposited a check,” also have “a 
reasonable expectation that his check will be examined for bank purposes only—to credit, debit or 
balance his account—and not recorded and kept on file for several years by Government decree 
so that it can be available for Government scrutiny”?
285
 Thus, one should be able to release 




The clear benefit of the purpose-based approach is that it places control over a 
constitutional right in the person who possesses it—the individual citizen. This purpose-based 
limit on the third-party doctrine also promotes the goal of avoiding another concern identified by 
Justice Marshall—the danger that the third-party doctrine could empower “the government to 
define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.”
287
 Justice Marshall had worried that if risk 
analysis was “dispositive in assessing the reasonableness of privacy expectations,” the 
government could shrink privacy simply by making public announcements of its “intent to 
monitor” various communications, such as mail or phone calls.
288
 If, instead, the citizen is 
protected by the purpose-based approach, he or she preserves the choice over what personal 
information will and will not be private. 
By requiring a warrant for searches of cell phone information voluntarily disclosed to 
remote servers,
289
 Riley might be adopting a more nuanced approach to information shared with 
third parties. Indeed, much of the Court’s opinion focused on the purposes individuals pursued in 
having or using cell phones. Riley urged that cell phone privacy must be protected precisely 
because of the many purposes these “minicomputers” have; the Court noted that these versatile 
devices “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”
290
 Cell phones therefore 
served their owners’ purposes in “nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the 
intimate.”
291
 In noting all the various activities for which phones were used, Riley did not find 
privacy lacking because so many of these tasks required sharing with myriad third parties. 
Instead, the Court viewed all the purposes of a cell phone, which have “the ability to store many 
                                                                
283  Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 95-96 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
284  Id. at 96 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352). 
285  Id. at 96. 
286  Smith, 442 U.S. at 752 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
287  Id. at 750. 
288  Id.  
289  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491. 
290  Id. at 2489. 
291  Id. at 2490. 
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different types of information,” as a reason to protect the owner’s privacy.
292
 Thus, for Riley, the 
interactions with third parties actually strengthened Fourth Amendment interests. Riley turned the 
decades-old third-party doctrine on its head; the more connections with others, the more sharing 
of information with third parties, and the more one could claim in the Fourth Amendment privacy 
in one’s phone. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Riley was hardly the first case in which the Court had to come to terms with the 
implications of advancing technology. In Olmstead v. United States, the Court considered 
government wiretapping of a Seattle bootlegger’s phone line.
293
 Olmstead ruled that, since the 
wiretaps “were made without trespass upon” the defendant’s property,
294
 “[t]here was no 
searching [and] False no seizure.”
295
 The Olmstead Court, wrestling with concerns about a 
technology invented a mere fifty years prior, feared enlarging the Fourth Amendment “beyond 
[its] possible practical meaning.”
296
 Olmstead concluded that “[t]he language of the amendment 
cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world.”
297
 
The Court also noted, in a passage anticipating the assumption of risk reasoning later offered in 
the third-party doctrine, that a person who installed a phone in his home intended to “project his 
voice to those quite outside,” and therefore deserved no Fourth Amendment protection.
298
 
Justice Brandeis, in his Olmstead dissent, worried not about an expanded Fourth 
Amendment, but about greater government intrusion.
299
 While officials at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted were limited to the crude and forceful expedient of breaking and entry, 
modern government possessed “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy.”
300
 
Wiretapping was a grave concern, for it intruded on not only the caller, but also all those who 
conversed with him.
301
 Such phone intrusions made “writs of assistance and general warrants” 
merely “puny instruments of tyranny” by comparison.
302
 
Decades into telephone technology, Olmstead offers a lens through which to view Riley, 
itself only decades into digital technology. In recognizing the significant distinctions, both 
quantitative and qualitative,
303
 between cell phones and other physical items, the Court, by 2014, 
had come to appreciate Justice Brandeis’ concerns about government intrusion growing with each 
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“[d]iscovery and invention.”
304
 Riley, however, in basing its ruling on the constitutional difference 
between digital devices and pre-digital objects, has now created two categories of Fourth 
Amendment “effects.” The full implications of drawing such a new line are simply unknown. 
Further, when Riley equated cell phone privacy with that of the home,
305
 it confirmed 
Justice Brandeis’s prediction in Olmstead: 
Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will 
be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
306
 
Indeed, Riley deemed a cell phone search to typically be “far more” intrusive than a 
house search because it would not only expose “sensitive records” of the home, but also 
information “never found in a home.”
307
 In equating cell phones with the Fourth Amendment’s 
“core”—the home—Riley extended Fourth Amendment privacy so dramatically that the Court 
could later suffer buyer’s remorse. If it later limits cell phone privacy, the Court could also limit 
the privacy of the home, now that houses are linked with phones. Finally, Olmstead’s dismissal of 
a caller’s privacy claim on the grounds that in using the phone the caller intended to “project his 
voice to those quite outside” will no longer resonate with a post-Riley Court.
308
 The third-party 
doctrine limiting the privacy of those who share information is inconsistent with Riley’s assertion 
that the location of information on a phone or in the cloud “makes little difference.”
309
 
Riley declared that cell phones, “[w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal,” hold 
“‘the privacies of life,’” and therefore are “worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought.”
310
 Despite its apparent grandiosity, Riley was right to invoke the American Revolution in 
finding the cell phone worthy of Fourth Amendment protection.
311
 Although smart phones are 
objects of which our Founding “[F]athers could not have dreamed,”
312
 applying the Constitution 
requires contemplation not “only of what has been but of what may be.”
313
 The search of a phone 
recovered during an arrest provides such vast material that it amounts to a general warrant or writ 
of assistance of colonial times.
314
 In reaching the correct conclusion, however, Riley offered 
sweeping statements touching on the classification of effects, the privacy of the home, and the 
viability of the third-party doctrine. The impact of such pronouncements, while uncertain, could 
be profound. 
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